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Introduction 
 
 
Moving towards Political Participation 
The Moderation of Moroccan Salafis since the Beginning of the Arab Spring 
Mohammed Masbah 
Salafis, including former “Salafi-Jihadis”, have become a presence in the public sphere 
through their participation in the protests – side-by-side with secular forces – of the 
so-called 20 February Movement. There are also numerous indications that Salafis will 
play a role in shaping Morocco’s future political landscape, albeit while proposing less 
radical objectives than what they used to profess. The trend is leading towards greater 
acceptance of political plurality, more cooperation with moderate Islamists, and less 
aggressive attitudes towards seculars and Western governments. Most importantly, 
they are explicitly renouncing violent means in the domestic power struggle. Moroccan 
Salafis have begun aiming at assuming a political role, attempting to influence policy-
making, and are increasingly prepared to play by the rules of the democratic game – 
thus following the example set by their peers in other Arab countries such as Egypt. 
 
Moroccan Salafis gained increased visibility 
in the public sphere through the wave of 
protests launched by the 20 February Move-
ment in all major Moroccan cities in early 
2011, inspired by the upheavals that swept 
the Arab world. Unlike their peers in Egypt, 
who initially condemned the upheavals as 
khuruj (i.e. a rebellion against the ruler re-
jected in Islam), the Moroccan Salafis not 
only blessed the Arab revolutions, but also 
actively participated in the 20 February 
Movement. This created a political oppor-
tunity to achieve the release of Salafis from 
prison, and ask for rehabilitation and com-
pensation for what they held to be arbitrary 
persecution by the authorities. For Moroc-
can Salafis, the 20 February Movement 
served as an excellent stage to return back 
to the public scene, from which they had 
been effectively banned after the 16 May 
2003 terrorist attacks in Casablanca. Al-
though most of them never engaged in 
actual violence – and no direct links to the 
attacks were ever established – at the time, 
many prominent Salafis had been tried and 
incarcerated for having the alleged moral 
responsibility of being ideological instiga-
tors of desperate youths and for “praising 
terrorism”. 
The authorities’ response to the 20 Feb-
ruary Movement was quick, and it efficient-
ly managed to dissipate some of the resent-
ment of this particular group of protesters. 
Less than two months after the unrest 
began, King Mohammed VI issued a royal 
pardon to 190 political prisoners, among 
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them the well-known Salafi leader Moham-
med Fizazi, as well as tens of other Salafis, 
most of whom had already served the larger 
parts of their sentences. The authorities 
also allowed the prominent Salafi scholar 
Mohammed Maghraoui back from his exile 
in Saudi Arabia, where he had fled to in 
September 2008 after issuing a notorious 
fatwa (i.e. Islamic legal opinions) allowing 
for the marriage of underage girls, which 
was considered to contradict the new 
Moroccan family law (Moudawana) intro-
duced by the King in 2003. 
Changes in attitudes and behaviour 
Since their release from prison in April 
2011, prominent Salafi leaders have sur-
prised observers with a change in ideas and 
behaviour. This followed as a result of the 
20 February Movement protests as well as 
a demand for pardon in February 2012 by 
Mustafa Ramid, the PJD minister of justice 
and freedoms. Prominent Salafi leaders 
have publicly declared to accept democracy 
as well as the monarchy, instead of asking 
for the restoration of the Caliphate. They 
have also softened some positions relating 
to the participation of women in public 
life, voiced sympathy and support for the 
moderate Islamist Justice and Development 
Party (PJD), indicated a willingness to cre-
ate political parties and/or religion-based 
NGOs, endorsed the 2011 constitution, and 
called upon people to vote in the constitu-
tional referendum. Last but not least, they 
have participated in debates with seculars 
in the public sphere (such as in university 
campuses, the media, etc.). 
These declarations mark a profound 
change from the positions they held before 
the Arab Spring, when Salafis were not 
directly involved in politics, which were 
considered un-Islamic and incompatible 
with Sharia law. Also, democracy was con-
sidered an innovation without any prece-
dents or roots in the period of the prophet 
and his companions. Indeed, one decade 
ago, some Salafis had called democracy a 
“new idol worshipped instead of God”. 
Still, while the majority of those called 
Salafi-Jihadis had supported some ideas of 
al-Qaida – a sentiment shared by a consider-
able part of the Moroccan population – they 
had never resorted to violence themselves. 
Who are they?  
And what do they want? 
Such attitudes to politics are rooted in 
deep ideological and religious convictions. 
Salafis are usually described as those Sunni 
Muslims who propagate to follow, literally, 
the fundamental Islamic sources: the Quran 
and the Sunna (i.e. prophetic tradition) as 
well as the model of al-Salaf al-Salih, that is, 
the pious forefathers who lived during the 
first three generations after the prophet. 
However, this definition is not precise 
because these ideas are shared by most 
other Islamist groups, and even by a great 
majority of Muslims. What sets the Salafis 
apart is their rigidity concerning ideology 
and social behaviour. They hold that reli-
gious texts have only one single meaning, 
which is clear in itself, and that only reli-
gious (Salafi) scholars can interpret God’s 
word, that is, that all other interpretations 
are false, or at least inaccurate. In other 
words, they monopolize the absolute truth. 
They also believe that strictly and liter-
ally following God’s words is a precondition 
for eventually entering paradise. They 
therefore stick to the strict adherence to 
details and forms in both rites and every-
day activities. Hence, the long untrimmed 
beards, the wearing of the niqab (facial veil) 
for women and other traditional garments, 
etc. The focus is on the propagation of the 
correct individual religiosity – that is, up-
holding ’aqida (correct Islamic doctrine) and 
fighting bid’a (illegitimate innovation in 
religion) – through individual and collec-
tive preaching in mosques and at religious 
and social events, as well as through new 
media, such as CDs, Facebook, websites, etc. 
For Salafis, public affairs have not been 
a priority. Since truth is one and revealed, 
there is no need for a public sphere in 
order to deliberate. Differences of opinion 
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amount to apostasy, which is supposed to 
be fought against, not discussed about. All 
human innovations that do not have a pre-
cedent in the historical Islamic experience 
are prohibited. Institutions and concepts – 
such as the nation-state, parliament, or the 
separation of powers – are seen as innova-
tions without precedent in Islamic tra-
ditions. As a result of this reasoning, Salafis 
have traditionally refused to participate in 
modern political institutions. These have 
been considered apostasy by the takfiri 
strand of the Salafis (i.e. those who declare 
other Muslims, for one reason or the other, 
to be infidels who should repent or be 
punished) and considered by the “quietist” 
strand of the Salafis to be a matter that just 
does not concern them. 
In social reality, Salafis in Morocco (as 
everywhere) are not unified and often dis-
agree about social priorities and agendas. 
In Morocco, to date, Salafis are not strongly 
organized, either at the local or national 
levels. There are exceptions, such as some 
Quranic schools that are fully legalized 
and organized, and there have been some 
attempts to create informal networks that 
could pave the way for a future coalition 
among some former Salafi-Jihadi prisoners. 
However, the mainstream trend within the 
Moroccan Salafiyya is still without a clearly 
defined structure, does not have a united 
leadership, and professes divergent prior-
ities. As a result, they have limited capacity 
in influencing political developments, 
though some of them are aware of their 
potential to influence politics: “If Salafis 
were organized in a political party, they 
would be a force to reckon with,” as a 
famous Salafi sheikh mentioned in Novem-
ber 2012. 
Within this rather amorphous and fluid 
movement of Salafis in Morocco, four types, 
or currents, can be distinguished, based on 
two criteria: 1) ideology: rigidity vs. prag-
matism, and 2) political attitudes: politi-
cized vs. non-political. 
(1) The quietists, sometimes also de-
scribed as “traditionalists” or as “scientific 
Salafiyya”: These are mainly religious 
scholars and ideologues and their adepts, 
whose main focus is to teach and study 
religious knowledge in mosques, Quranic 
schools, and religion-based NGOs. One good 
example for this is the NGO the Moroccan 
Association to Call for the Quran and the 
Sunna, which is run by Sheikh Mohammed 
Maghraoui. 
(2) Politicians and pragmatics: This is a 
new trend initiated by some former Salafi-
Jihadis. The main figure is Sheikh Mo-
hamed Fizazi, who is working to create a 
political party, or at least a religion-orien-
tated NGO. One example of such an NGO 
would be al-Tawhid wal-Islah (Unity and 
Reform Movement), which is a legalized 
NGO with a Muslim Brotherhood orienta-
tion and has a strategic alliance with the 
moderate Islamist party PJD. However, to 
date, Fizazi has not succeeded yet to con-
vince the main Salafi leaders to engage 
with him in establishing a political party. 
(3) The Haraki (Arabic for “Movement”) 
civil society activists: Formed mainly by 
former prisoners, these groups try to 
establish structures of social support. For 
example, recently, the well-known sheikhs 
Mohammed Rafiki Abou Hafs and Hassan 
Kettani established an NGO called Dar 
al-Hikma (House of Wisdom), which is 
supporting young people to get married, 
organizing training sessions in skills 
development, and producing research. 
(4) The so-called Jihadi prisoners and 
their support groups: These are organized 
in informal networks comprised of former 
Salafi-Jihadi prisoners and their families. 
Most of them are ideologically rigid. Thus, 
while there have been several attempts to 
mediate their release under the condition 
of them renouncing violence and recog-
nizing monarchy, they have failed to com-
ply with these demands. The Joint Commit-
tee for the Defense of Islamist Detainees is 
one of the most active groups, with their 
priority now being the struggle for releas-
ing hundreds of imprisoned Salafis. 
 SWP Comments 1 
January 2013 
4 
Early signs of moderation 
Since the beginning of the Arab Spring, 
there has been an increasing tendency 
among Moroccan Salafis to participate in 
the public sphere and the political process. 
There are clear signs that such political 
involvement goes hand-in-hand with a no-
table shift towards moderation regarding 
attitudes and behaviour. Moderation in 
this regard should be understood as, first, 
renouncing the use of violence to achieve 
one’s goals. This occurs at the level of atti-
tudes by not engaging in takfirism (i.e. con-
sidering other Muslims as infidels, which 
serves as the ideological justification to use 
violence against them). It also occurs at the 
level of behaviour by not using violence 
against the “near enemy”, that is, Muslim 
states, societies, and civilians, as well as 
against non-Muslim states, as long as they 
are not occupying Muslim territory. Sec-
ond, moderation should be understood as 
accepting pluralism, the rule of law, and 
playing according to the rules of the game, 
that is, not working as a secretive organiza-
tion. 
Indeed, Moroccan Salafis are becoming 
increasingly more moderate in this sense. 
Even ultra-conservative types have started 
to revise their positions and behaviour, 
with the exception of some marginal ele-
ments, who still maintain puritan and 
strict attitudes towards the state and soci-
ety, thereby increasingly alienating them-
selves from the public. 
In fact, the first signs of a tendency 
towards moderation were apparent even 
before the onset of the Arab Spring. For 
example, in March 2007, Sheikh Abou Hafs 
wrote a paper in prison titled Anssifouna 
(Do Justice to Us), in which he explained his 
political views. In the paper he condemned 
the violent attacks in Morocco and all Mus-
lim countries and distanced himself from 
the practice of takfir. He also endorsed the 
monarchy. 
Another perhaps less obvious – but 
nevertheless significant – sign of modera-
tion were the hunger strikes of Salafi pris-
oners after their imprisonment in the wake 
of the 2003 attacks. In fact, hunger strikes 
are strictly forbidden (haram) in Islamic 
doctrine, as are all actions liable to cause 
harm to one’s own body, and therefore they 
are strongly condemned by conservative 
Muslims. By ignoring such prohibitions and 
adopting hunger strikes as a pragmatic tool 
to make their voices heard and to create 
general sympathy and awareness for their 
situation, Salafis demonstrated two essen-
tial aspects of moderation: readiness to 
compromise on and suspend ideological 
prescriptions for the sake of political objec-
tives; and a keen interest to engage with 
the public sphere in order to win as allies 
parts of society that do not share their ide-
ology. They also called on journalists (some-
times even women) to provide them with 
information. These protests and hunger 
strikes increased even more after the self-
immolation of Mohammed Bouazizi in 
December 2010 in Tunisia. 
Factors conducive to moderation 
The shift towards moderation by the 
Moroccan Salafis is a multi-faceted and 
complex process. Factors contributing to 
the unique situation in Morocco (in com-
parison with other North African countries) 
and towards the decrease in confronta-
tional relations between state actors and 
the Salafis are: (1) the continuity of the 
regime and its religious legitimacy; (2) the 
monarchy’s strategy in dealing with the 
Salafis; (3) the electoral success of Islamists 
in general, and more particularly of the 
PJD; and (4) the effects of the Arab Spring. 
The first and most important factor in 
the unique situation in Morocco that has 
shown to be conducive to the moderation 
of Moroccan Salafis is the continuity of the 
regime and its role in the religious sphere. 
The latter has clearly limited the Salafis’ 
room for manoeuvre as well as their aspira-
tions, with regard to the assumption of 
political power. The monarchy plays a sig-
nificant role, as it claims a monopoly on 
religious and political legitimacy, and it 
has the power to impose its own rules on 
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all other actors. In contrast to other North 
African countries (such as Libya, Tunisia, 
and Egypt), the regime has not changed in 
the context of the Arab Spring. Indeed, the 
monarchy in Morocco has persisted for 
more than twelve centuries and still enjoys 
an extraordinary degree of legitimacy in 
the eyes of the people. 
Even if the 2011 constitution limits some 
of the monarch’s powers de jure, he still 
remains very powerful, in particular in 
the realm of religion. According to the con-
stitution, the king is the only person who 
combines religious and political authority, 
as head of state and Commander of the 
Faithful (Amir al-Mu’minin). He chairs the 
Higher Council of Ulemas (i.e. religious 
scholars) and appoints its members. The 
council, in turn, has the monopoly on 
issuing fatwas. Everyday questions of ordi-
nary Muslims are answered via their local 
councils, which are also appointed by the 
king. The king also appoints the Minister of 
Religious Endowments and Islamic Affairs, 
who is accountable directly to him and not 
to the head of government. And he has the 
exclusive power to legislate in religious 
affairs by royal decree, according to article 
41 of the new constitution. 
Indeed, already after the 2003 Casa-
blanca attacks, the Moroccan government 
launched a vast project of restructuring the 
religious sphere, with the declared objec-
tive of protecting the “spiritual security” of 
its citizens, that is, fighting off the ideas 
of al-Qaida, and preventing such ideas from 
gaining traction with the faithful. As a con-
sequence, the Ministry of Religious Endow-
ments and Islamic Affairs today controls 
the religious discourse in the mosques by 
unifying the content of Friday sermons 
(khutba) and “containing radical discourse 
in the mosque”. It also appoints almost all 
the religious personnel in 50,000 mosques 
in Morocco as well as in the Quranic 
schools. 
The second factor that has led to more 
moderation has been the Moroccan mon-
archy’s stick-and-carrot strategy towards 
Salafi actors after 2003. On the one hand, 
radical elements were relentlessly re-
pressed, a large number of Salafis were 
arrested – often arbitrarily and on ques-
tionable legal grounds – and dozens of 
clandestine mosques and some Quranic 
schools were closed. On the other hand, 
activities of “quietists” were tolerated. 
Thus, among thousands of Salafis prose-
cuted since 2003, only very few have been 
adepts of Mohammed Maghraoui. 
The third factor is related to the Salafis’ 
fascination with the increasingly greater 
role played by mainstream Islamists in the 
region, above all the PJD’s role in Morocco. 
As a legal political party with tens of asso-
ciated NGOs, the PJD has gained legitimacy 
via participating in elections and has been 
successfully leading a government since 
December 2011. Their example made the 
Salafis take note that political participation 
can yield concrete outcomes by influencing 
policy-making and by protecting the social 
movement from harassment by the author-
ities. After the 2003 attacks, some political 
leaders had made calls to dissolve the PJD, 
accusing it of possessing the “moral respon-
sibility” for promoting terrorism. Indeed, 
back then, several prominent Salafi leaders 
explicitly supported the PJD’s positions and 
expressed admiration for its organization 
and leaders. That admiration was trans-
lated into calls by several sheikhs to vote 
for the PJD in the November 2011 elections. 
It is difficult though to prove concretely 
their electoral influence, as they had been 
boycotting elections for a long period, and 
therefore most of their followers were not 
listed on the voter registers. 
Some PJD leaders explained this support 
as being the returning of favours for the 
PJD’s defence of the right of Salafis to exist, 
its criticism of the authorities’ harassment 
and repression against Salafi Quranic 
schools in 2008, and the support given to 
Salafi detainees by Mountada Karama, 
which is a human rights NGO close to the 
PJD. However, Salafi support has not always 
been a blank cheque. There has been criti-
cism and disagreement, both ideologically 
and with regard to political choices. Some 
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Salafis have been dissatisfied with the PJD’s 
incapacity to implement Islamic principles 
and rules as a governing party. This is due 
to, among other factors, the complexity of 
the Moroccan political system, which forces 
actors to work in government coalitions 
rather than through one-party rule. This 
has been seen as “weakening the Islamist 
project”. Some Salafis even organized a sit-
in in front of the PJD party headquarters in 
Rabat in February 2012. Salafis also strongly 
criticized the statements of the PJD Minis-
ter of Justice, Mustafa Ramid, concerning 
the absence of political detainees in Moroc-
co, or statements by a well-known lawyer 
and current PJD Parliamentarian, in which 
he denied the existence of systematic tor-
ture in Moroccan prisons. 
The fourth factor leading to Salafi mod-
eration was the overthrow of Tunisia’s and 
Egypt’s dictators. This was done in a largely 
peaceful manner, with broad participation 
by all segments of society and accompanied 
by practiced tolerance and solidarity be-
tween Islamists and secularists, Muslims 
and Christians during the Tahrir Square 
protests in Cairo. These developments had 
a significant bearing on the Salafis’ world-
view. Actually, in the beginning, major 
Salafi scholars from several countries, such 
as Saudi Arabia, had clearly stated that the 
protests were considered a rebellion against 
the ruler and thus completely forbidden 
according to Islam. In turn, Yusuf Al-Qara-
dawi, a prominent Sunni scholar linked to 
the Muslim Brotherhood and president of 
the International Union of Muslim Schol-
ars, openly criticized Salafis for discrediting 
Arab revolutions. 
However, Moroccan Salafis (as well as 
many others) were stunned by the peaceful 
character of the mass movements. Perhaps 
for the first time in the history of Arab 
societies, a peaceful mass protest against 
oppressive rulers took place, involving 
“normal” citizens of all segments of society. 
This created an “abnormality” in the con-
ceptual framework of the Salafis, in which 
order is valued over everything else, as 
expressed in the statement “Obey the (ruler) 
even if he steals your money and skin of 
your back.” Even the use of the term “revo-
lution” with regards to these developments 
was a new addition to the political termi-
nology of Salafis. As described above, tra-
ditional Islamic political thought would 
use the term khuruj, that is, rebellion 
against the ruler, for such a situation, im-
plying that a minority take up arms to seize 
power. This was seen as fundamentally 
illegitimate, as it threatened to create fitna 
(i.e. discord), and hence threatened the very 
existence of the Islamic community and 
order. The largely peaceful revolutions in 
Tunisia and Egypt took Salafis to a different 
and unfamiliar political and intellectual 
space, which they are now trying to adapt 
to at the ideological and behavioural levels. 
To date, it is still unclear what effect the 
much less peaceful revolutions in Libya and 
Syria have had on the Salafis’ thinking. It is 
also unclear if accepting to play according 
to the rules of the game equals embracing 
not only the procedures but also the con-
tent of democracy. While the Arab Spring 
has pushed Moroccan Salafis towards par-
ticipation in the public sphere as well as 
accepting plurality, the rule of law, and 
political freedoms, this should not be con-
sidered a linear and irreversible process. 
They will definitely need time to adapt to 
the new realities. Whether this adaptation 
will result in further moderation or re-
radicalization depends crucially on their 
being accepted by the monarchy and other 
forces as legitimate societal and political 
players. 
The future of Salafis’ 
political participation 
In contrast to developments in other parts 
of North Africa, Moroccan Salafis up to now 
have neither constituted political parties 
and run in elections, as in Egypt, nor have 
they radicalized, as in Libya and Tunisia, 
where Salafis have been blamed for vio-
lence, for example against US embassies, 
and for the destruction of Sufi shrines. 
Well-known Moroccan Salafi leaders have 
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even called upon their peers in Tunisia to 
support the revolution, reject violence, and 
work within the political system and the 
framework of the state. In other words, 
Moroccan Salafis actually stand between 
the two larger regional Salafi tendencies: 
They have not established political parties 
or been fully recognized as political actors; 
nor do they work illegally or use violence. 
Until now, only one prominent Salafi 
leader, Mohammed Fizazi, has announced 
that he is willing to create a political party, 
and he will have to convince other sheikhs 
to participate. Other former Salafi-Jihadis 
are striving to create religion-based NGOs, 
while others again prefer to stay out of 
politics. 
At this point in time, it is unclear 
whether Salafis will succeed in organizing 
into modern structures and in adapting 
their ideologies to more practical politics 
and public affairs. One of the challenges 
linked to that will be to distinguish be-
tween a focus on da’awa (religious predi-
cation) and politics, with the first requiring 
normative discourses and the second de-
manding more pragmatic attitudes and 
behaviour and a translation of principles 
into practical policies. 
The Arab Spring created an important 
political opportunity for Salafis to become 
more moderate. If they want to have an 
influence in the public sphere, however, 
they will have to consolidate their presence 
by establishing legalized NGOs, partici-
pating in public debates, and producing a 
political language understood by all seg-
ments of society rather than only religious 
(or Salafi) people. They will also have to 
work against foreign influences and dis-
tinguish their beliefs from both Saudi 
Wahhabism and al-Qaida ideology, while 
drawing a firm line against the use of 
violence. 
It is difficult to predict whether Moroc-
can authorities would allow a Salafi politi-
cal party to be legalized or not, due to secu-
rity and political concerns. One example 
of the kind of repressive stance that the 
regime might take against Salafis in the 
future is the drastic repression of protests 
by the police after the 28 April 2011 ter-
rorist attack in Marrakech, as well as the 
repression by police after attempts by the 
20 February Movement to protest in front 
of the alleged secret prison of Temara, in 
which several human rights NGOs had 
already reported torture and human rights 
abuses in the period after the 2003 terrorist 
attacks. 
Also, the palace is already struggling to 
manage its relations with the moderate 
Islamist party PJD, which accepted to play 
according to the rules of the game and 
succeeded in winning a plurality in the 
November 2011 elections. Obliged by the 
new constitution, the king had to choose 
the head of government from the party that 
received the most seats in elections. Thus, 
for the first time, the PJD formed the gov-
ernment. 
Still, there are two divide-and-rule strat-
egies that might lead Moroccan authorities 
to allow for the establishment of a Salafi 
political party: (1) if they feel that it can 
weaken the PJD by splitting their electoral 
base, especially among urban, educated, 
pious citizens; (2) if the Salafis were to inte-
grate into an already established, yet weak 
political party trusted by the authorities, 
such as the moderate Islamist Party of Re-
naissance and Virtue, a split-off from the 
PJD that formed an alliance in the 2011 
elections with the Party of Authenticity and 
Modernity created by an advisor to the 
king. 
In the near future, the most likely sce-
nario is that the authorities will legalize 
one or several Salafi NGOs and watch their 
attitudes and behaviour before legalizing 
Salafi political parties. However, even if 
Salafis agree to establish a political party, 
and authorities allow them to enter directly 
into politics, in the short to mid-term, they 
will most probably not see a rise in popu-
larity similar to that of Egypt’s Salafi Nour 
Party, namely because they face several 
obstacles. First and foremost, they do not 
have as many resources as their Egyptian 
peers; in particular, they do not possess 
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media and satellite channels or have a net-
work of strong grassroots NGOs. Nor do 
they receive strong financial support from 
Saudi Arabia. 
Recommendations 
Europe has little leverage over Salafis, but 
it can exert quite some influence on the 
Moroccan monarchy. It would be important 
to encourage the Moroccan authorities to 
include moderate Salafi elements – in-
cluding former Salafi-Jihadis – in the politi-
cal process and the public sphere by allow-
ing the establishment of Salafi political 
parties and NGOs, as well as the inclusion 
of moderate Salafi elements into official 
religious bodies. Also, the monarchy should 
be discouraged from again repressing polit-
ical activities of non-violent Salafis so as to 
prevent renewed radicalization. One im-
portant element in such a policy would be 
for the authorities to recognize past human 
rights abuses and to establish a new Equity 
and Reconciliation Commission to correct 
the errors committed after the 2003 
attacks. 
For Europeans, it is important to under-
stand that the Salafi spectrum is very 
heterogeneous. Europeans should engage 
in dialogue with its moderate members 
on issues related to political and societal 
freedoms and the rule of law. The United 
States has already started to engage in such 
a dialogue with the most moderate mem-
bers of the Salafi spectrum, represented by 
leaders such as Mohammed Fizazi. 
Europeans should also be aware that 
they are perceived by Salafis (as well as by 
other actors in the region) as having sup-
ported dictators in the region and their 
repression of a peaceful Salafiyya, not least 
in the context of the global war on terror. 
Such perceptions will only be changed 
through persistent engagement with all 
non-violent forces in the region, whether 
Europeans agree with their policies and 
values or not. 
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